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INTERNATIONAL SERVICE OF PROCESS
UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
 W. Mark C. Weidemaier
Service of process – i.e., the formal delivery of documents that are legally sufficient to charge
the defendant with notice of a pending action1 – is generally necessary before any significant
step in a lawsuit, such as entry of judgment against a party, may be taken.2 This is true
whether the parties to the lawsuit are located within or outside the United States. When faced
with a challenge to the validity of service on a party within the United States, however, the
court’s inquiry may be straightforward. Rule 4(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure authorizes the use of a variety of alternative methods of service. Proof of service
by any of these methods will suffice to establish jurisdiction over any party otherwise subject
to the personal jurisdiction of the court.3
It is increasingly common, however, for litigation to involve parties located outside the
United States. The expansion of international trade and the growing ease of international
travel have resulted in a large number of international business and other relationships that
may result in litigation.4 These disputes have appeared in state and federal courts in great

1.

See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988).

2. See, e.g., G.S. § 1-75.3; First Union Nat’l Bank v. Rolfe, 83 N.C. App. 625, 628, 351 S.E.2d
117, 119 (1986) (noting constitutional “mandate[] that a party be given notice and an opportunity to be
heard before he can be deprived of a legal claim or defense”).
3. See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)-(9); see also G.S. §§ 1-75.3(b)(1); State ex rel. Desselberg v.
Peele, 136 N.C. App. 206, 208, 523 S.E.2d 125, 127 (1999).
4. See, e.g., Senate Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure – Establishment, S.
REP. NO. 2392 at 3 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5201, 5202-03 (stating that the “extensive
increase in international, commercial and financial transactions involving both individuals and
governments and the resultant disputes, leading sometimes to litigation, has pointedly demonstrated the
need and desirability for a comprehensive study of the extent to which international judicial assistance
can be obtained”).
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variety, from product liability suits by U.S. residents
against foreign defendants,5 to international business
disputes between U.S. and foreign companies,6 to
personal injury and other suits by U.S. residents based
on a foreign defendant’s conduct while in the United
States.7 Likewise, the ease of international travel, not
to mention the presence of members of the U.S. Armed
Forces overseas, lends an international dimension to
disputes, such as paternity, divorce, and child custody
and support, more traditionally viewed as “domestic”
in character.8

process, which can often be accomplished with relative
ease, international service of process has been
described as “complex and time consuming,”10 and
“bordered on all sides with fatal pitfalls.”11 Not
surprisingly, then, courts are frequently called upon to
decide the validity of a party’s attempts to serve an
adversary located overseas.12
This bulletin addresses some commonlyencountered issues related to international service of
process, particularly those arising under the
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters, also known as the Hague Convention (the
“Convention”).13 Although the bulletin provides an

As in a lawsuit between domestic parties, the court
may not render a judgment against a party located
outside the United States unless that party has been
properly served.9 But unlike domestic service of

exercise personal jurisdiction over, a party subject to
jurisdiction under the “long-arm” statute if the party has been
served “pursuant to” or “in accordance” with “Rule 4(j) or
4(j1).” Service outside the U.S., however, is authorized by
Rule 4(j3), to which these sections do not refer at all.

5. See, e.g., Warzynski v. Empire Comfort Sys., Inc.,
102 N.C. App. 222, 401 S.E.2d 801 (1991); Hayes v. Evergo
Tel. Co., Ltd., 100 N.C. App. 474, 397 S.E.2d 325 (1990);
Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 64 N.C. App. 41, 306 S.E.2d
562 (1983).

This seems to be an oversight. G.S. §§ 1-75.3 and 175.6 were enacted in 1967. See 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws c. 954
§ 2. Rule 4’s international service provisions were added
two years later, as Rule 4(j)(9)d, see 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws c.
895 § 4, and therefore fell within the existing references in
these sections to “Rule 4(j).” The international service
provisions were later moved to 4(j3). See 1981 N.C. Sess.
Laws c. 540 § 3. But although in 1995 the long-arm statute
was amended to include a reference to Rule 4(j3), see 1995
N.C. Sess. Laws c. 389 § 1 (amending G.S. § 1-75.4), no
such amendment was made to G.S. §§ 1-75.3 or 1-75.6.
Compare 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws c. 231 (amending G.S. §§ 175.3, 1-75.4, and 1-75.6 to add a reference to Rule 4(j1) after
provisions governing service by publication, formerly in
Rule 4(j), were moved to 4(j1)).

6. See, e.g., Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304 (4th
Cir. 1998); Eplus Technology, Inc. v. Aboud, 155 F. Supp. 2d
692 (E.D. Va. 2001).
7. See, e.g., Hocke v. Hanyane, 118 N.C. App. 630,
456 S.E.2d 858 (1995); Randolph v. Hendry, 50 F. Supp. 2d
572 (S.D. W. Va. 1999).
8. See, e.g., Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 124 N.C. App.
255, 477 S.E.2d 239 (1996); see also Maj. Wendy P. Daknis,
Home Sweet Home: A Practical Approach to Domicile, 177
Mil. L. Rev. 49, 62 n.75 (2003) (noting that, in 2001, the
U.S. Army’s Legal Assistance Offices assisted over 29,000
clients with divorce-related issues); Maj. Alan L. Cook, The
Armed Forces as a Model Employer in Child Support
Enforcement: A Proposal to Improve Service of Process on
Military Members, 155 Mil. L. Rev. 153, 153-54 & nn. 4-6
(1998) (noting varying estimates that the federal government,
and primarily the Department of Defense, employed up to
100,000 parents who were in arrears on child support
obligations).

10. Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd., 805 F. Supp. 3, 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
11. Gary B. Born, International Civil Litigation in
United States Courts 757 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 3d ed. 1996)
(quotation omitted) [herein, “Born”].
12. See, e.g., Hayes, 100 N.C. App. 474, 397 S.E.2d
325; Warzynski, 102 N.C. App. at 222, 401 S.E.2d at 801;
Hanyane, 118 N.C. App. 630, 456 S.E.2d 858; see also G.S.
§ 1-75.11 (requiring court to verify proper service and
existence of personal jurisdiction before entering judgment
against non-appearing defendant).

9. See Warzynski, 102 N.C. App. at 228, 401 S.E.2d
at 805 (evaluating validity of service on defendant located
outside U.S.).
In addition to service of process, or an exemption to
service, the court must have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. North Carolina’s “long-arm” statute, G.S. § 175.4, identifies the circumstances under which courts have
personal jurisdiction over parties who have been served with
process “pursuant to Rule 4(j), Rule 4(j1), or Rule 4(j3)” of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. G.S. §§ 1-75.3
and 1-75.6 authorize courts to enter judgment against, or

13. See Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Done at the Hague November 15, 1965 (entered into
force for the United States February 10, 1969), 20 U.S.T.
361; T.I.A.S. 6638; 658 U.N.T.S. 163; 28 U.S.C. (Appendix
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International service of process
under North Carolina law

overview, it does not purport to be an exhaustive guide
to the Convention or to international service of process
generally.14 Instead, the bulletin focuses on the
interaction between the Convention and Rule 4(j3) of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which
authorizes service of process “in a place not within the
United States.” In particular, the bulletin focuses on
several issues that judges commonly encounter,
including:
•

when and where the Convention applies;

•

what methods of service the Convention
authorizes;

•

the countries in which service by mail is
available;

•

the procedural requirements for service by
mail, where it is available; and

•

the rules applicable to service of process on
U.S. servicemembers stationed overseas.

Any inquiry into the validity of international service of
process begins with Rule 4(j3) of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure. Because Rule 4(j3) is nearly
identical to federal Rule 4(f), federal cases are useful
interpretive guides.15
Rule 4(j3) establishes three basic categories of
international service methods.16 First, Rule 4(j3)(1)
directs parties to use an “internationally agreed means”
of service if one is available. Second, if there is no
15. See, e.g., Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 101, 176
S.E.2d 161, 165 (1970) (“[S]ince the federal and,
presumably, the New York rules are the source of NCRCP
we will look to the decisions of the[se] jurisdictions for
enlightenment and guidance . . .”). When added in 1969 as
Rule 4(j)(9)d, the international service provisions of N.C.
Rule 4 were modeled on the comparable provisions then
contained in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i). See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4,
comment to 1969 Amendment.

This is not an area of the law characterized by
great certainty. Nevertheless, this bulletin summarizes
those areas where the law provides clear guidance and,
in areas where guidance is lacking, attempts to provide
guidance consistent with the likely direction of North
Carolina law. The bulletin contains only a brief
discussion of international service on members of the
Armed Forces. Readers interested in a more thorough
discussion of service on members of the Armed
Forces, whether located in the United States or abroad,
should read Administration of Justice Bulletin No.
2004/08, Service of Process and the Military (Dec.
2004).

16. In relevant part, Rule 4(j3) provides:
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon
a defendant, other than an infant or an incompetent person,
may be effected in a place not within the United States:
(1) By any internationally agreed means reasonably
calculated to give notice, such as those means authorized by
the [Convention] . . .; or
(2) If there is no internationally agreed means of service
or the applicable international agreement allows other means
of service, provided that service is reasonably calculated to
give notice:
a. In the manner prescribed by the law of the
foreign country for service in that country in an action in any
of its courts of general jurisdiction;

following Fed. R. Civ. P. 4) [herein, “the Convention”]. A
searchable, electronic copy of the Convention can be found
on the website of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law <http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=
conventions.text&cid=17> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).

b. As directed by the foreign authority in response
to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or
c. Unless prohibited by the law of the foreign
country, by

14. There are any number of useful guides to
international service, particularly Bruno A. Ristau,
International Judicial Assistance: Civil and Commercial
(Int’l Law Inst. 2000) (“Ristau”) and Born, supra note 11.
The U.S. Department of State website also contains a variety
of materials related to international judicial assistance,
including a flyer discussing service of process abroad and
links to country-specific requirements <http://travel.
state.gov/law/judicial_assistance.html> (last visited Nov. 30,
2004).

1. Delivery to the individual personally of a copy
of the summons and the complaint and, upon a corporation,
partnership, association or other such entity, by delivery to
an officer or a managing or general agent;
2. Any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to
be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the
party to be served; or
(3) By other means not prohibited by international
agreement as may be directed by the court.
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internationally agreed means of service, or if the
“applicable international agreement” allows service by
other means, Rule 4(j3)(2) authorizes a number of
additional service methods, including:
•

service in a manner prescribed by the law of
the foreign country in an action in any of its
courts of general jurisdiction;

•

service in a manner directed by the foreign
authority in response to a letter rogatory; or

•

unless prohibited by the law of the foreign
country, service by personal delivery or by
any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, if
the mail is addressed and dispatched by the
clerk of court to the party to be served.17

means” of service, and the only one expressly
referenced in Rule 4(j3)(1), is the Hague Convention, a
multilateral treaty developed at the Tenth Session of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law in
October 1964.19 The Convention represents an attempt
to “improve the organization of mutual judicial
assistance . . . by simplifying and expediting the
procedure” for international service of process.20
Table A, at the end of this bulletin, lists the countries
(including any territories, possessions, or other
jurisdictional entities) in which the Convention is
presently in force.
When service is to be made in a country that has
ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention (a
“Contracting State”), the serving party must use the
Convention’s procedures.21 This is true whether the
lawsuit in which service is to be made is pending in
state or federal court.22 The Convention, however,
does not apply to every lawsuit involving a party
outside the United States, even a party physically
located in a Contracting State. Rather, by its terms the
Convention applies “in all cases, in civil or commercial
matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial
or extrajudicial document for service abroad.”23 Two
questions must therefore be answered before
determining that the Convention applies in a particular
case: is the lawsuit a “civil or commercial matter,” and
does service require the transmission of documents
abroad?

Finally, Rule 4(j3) permits the court to order service by
other means, provided the method used is not
prohibited by international agreement.
In each case, the manner of service must be
reasonably calculated to give notice to the defendant of
the lawsuit. This constraint ensures that the method of
service is consistent with constitutional due process
requirements of the North Carolina and U.S.
Constitutions.18

Rule 4(j3)(1): Service by “internationally
agreed means” such as the Hague
Convention
Rule 4(j3)(1) authorizes service by “any internationally
agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice” of
the action. The primary “internationally agreed
17.

19. See Born, supra note 11 at 797.
20. See Convention, preamble.
21. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705 (stating that
“compliance with the Convention is mandatory in all cases to
which it applies”); see also G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina
Civil Procedure § 4-24 (Michie, 2d ed. 1995) (same);
Lafarge Corp. v. Altech Environment, U.S.A., 220 F. Supp.
2d 823, 831 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Darden v. DaimlerChrysler
North Am. Holding Corp., 191 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Taft v. Moreau, 177 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D.
Vt. 1997).

See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(2)a, b, & c.

18. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process in any proceeding . . . is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be
of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information and it must afford a reasonable time for those
interested to make their appearance.” Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see
also McDonald’s Corp. v. Dwyer, 338 N.C. 445, 448, 450
S.E.2d 888, 891 (1994) (noting same requirement under N.C.
Constitution). Whether service meets this standard depends
on the circumstances of each case, including the availability
of other methods of service. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 31315; Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451-54 (1982).

22. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699. It is also true even if
the party to be served is a U.S. national living overseas. Rule
4(j3) applies to “service upon a defendant . . . [to] be effected
in a place not within the United States,” G.S. §1A-1, Rule
4(j3) (emphasis added), and does not distinguish between
U.S. nationals and other potential defendants.
23. Convention, Art. 1.
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What is a “Civil or Commercial” Matter?

agreed means,” service may be made by one of the
methods authorized by Rule 4(j3)(2) or 4(j3)(3).30

The Convention does not define “civil or commercial
matter,” nor does the Convention’s negotiating history
shed much light on the meaning of this term.24 The
various Contracting States appear to have divergent
views on its meaning. Some States, particularly civil
law jurisdictions, distinguish matters of “public law,”
such as administrative proceedings, from “private law”
civil and commercial matters. On this basis, some
Contracting States have declined to serve legal
documents issued by U.S. administrative agencies.25
Likewise, some Contracting States may not apply the
“civil or commercial” label to lawsuits seeking
multiple or punitive damages or asserting claims under
statutes, like the antitrust laws, viewed as establishing
“public law.”26

Does Service Require Transmission of a
Document Abroad?
Even in civil or commercial matters in which the party
to be served is located in a Contracting State, the
Convention does not apply unless “there is occasion to
transmit a . . . document for service abroad.”31
Whether service requires the transmission of
documents abroad is determined by the law of the
forum state.32 So, for example, a foreign corporation
authorized to do business in North Carolina may be
served by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to its registered agent or, if it has no agent,
to the Secretary of State.33 Because service in this
example does not require transmission of a document
abroad, the Convention does not apply.

Notwithstanding these divergent views on what
constitutes a “civil or commercial” matter, United
States practice has traditionally viewed all noncriminal cases, including administrative proceedings,
as “civil or commercial matters” to which the
Convention applies.27 State and federal courts in
North Carolina have taken a similar view, applying the
Convention broadly to family and domestic law
matters, as well as to other types of civil litigation.28

to which Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela are parties. See 14 Int’l Leg.
Mat. 339 (1975) (convention); 18 Int’l Leg. Mat. 1238
(1984) (additional protocol); U.S. Department of State flyer,
Service of Legal Documents Abroad <http://travel.state.gov/
law/ service_general.html> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
Unlike the Hague Convention, the Inter-American Service
Convention does not purport to be the exclusive mechanism
for serving parties located in signatory countries. See, e.g.,
Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A., 22 F.3d 634, 639-44
(5th Cir. 1994); Pizzabiocche v. Vinelli, 772 F Supp. 1245,
1249 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Born, supra note 11 at 835.

If the Convention does not apply – either in a rare
case not involving a “civil or commercial matter” or
because the party to be served is not located in a
Contracting State – then Rule 4(j3)(1) authorizes
service only if another “internationally agreed means”
is available.29 If there is no alternative “internationally
24. See Born, supra note 11 at 800.

30. The service methods set forth in Rule 4(j3)(2) are
also available if the applicable international agreement
allows service by other methods.

25. See Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-1-4(1), at 149.
26. See Born, supra note 11 at 800-01 & nn. 199-202.

31. Convention, Art. 1; see also G.S. § 1A-1, Rule
4(j3) (setting forth rules for effecting service “in a place not
within the United States”).

27. See 17 I.L.M. 319 (1978) (report to Secretary of
State by U.S. delegate to the 1977 Special Commission);
United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2001) (Convention not applicable to criminal
proceedings).

32. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700.
33. See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(6); G.S. § 55-15-07
(requiring foreign corporations authorized to transact
business in North Carolina to maintain a registered agent);
G.S. § 55D-33 (authorizing service on registered agent or, if
no registered agent exists, upon the Secretary of State). Cf.
Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 64 N.C. App. 41, 306 S.E.2d
562 (1983) (holding that service may be made upon
Secretary of State where Secretary is proper agent for service
of process, but incorrectly concluding that Secretary was
proper agent in that case); Wilson, supra note 21 § 4-24, at
74 n. 230 (noting incorrect conclusion in Bush).

28. See, e.g., Tataragasi, 124 N.C. App. 255, 477
S.E.2d 239 (custody action); In re Letter of Request from the
Amtsgericht Ingolstadt, Federal Republic of Germany, 82
F.3d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 1996) (paternity action; interpreting
the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad);
Warzynski, 102 N.C. App. 222, 401 S.E.2d 801 (product
liability action).
29. The only other “internationally agreed means” of
service appears to be the Inter-American Convention on
Letters Rogatory (the “Inter-American Service Convention”),
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Available Methods of Service Under the
Hague Convention

identifying the person to whom the documents were
delivered.38

Under Rule 4(j3)(1), a party to a civil or commercial
case requiring the transmission of service papers to a
defendant in a Contracting State must use one of the
procedures established by the Hague Convention.34
The principal innovation of the Convention, and its
primary and favored service mechanism, is service
through the Central Authority of the country in which
service is to be made.

The Convention, however, does not require use of
the Central Authority mechanism. Indeed, because
service via the Central Authority can be time
consuming and cumbersome, many litigants opt to use
alternative service mechanisms identified by the
Convention. These include:
Service via consular or diplomatic channels: Each
Contracting State may serve documents upon
persons abroad directly through its diplomatic or
consular agents. Each State, however, may object
to such service unless the document is to be served
on a national of the State from which the
documents originate.39 The Convention also
permits Contracting States to use consular agents
and, in exceptional circumstances, diplomatic
agents to forward service documents to designated
authorities in the receiving State.40 U.S. litigants,
however, typically may not rely on these methods
of service, as U.S. law prohibits foreign service
officers from serving process, or appointing others
to do so, in most cases.41

Article 2 of the Convention requires each
Contracting State to establish a Central Authority to
receive requests for service from other Contracting
States.35 The Central Authority of the receiving State
is obliged to execute service requests, either by formal
service under the local law of the receiving State, or by
a method requested by the serving party (unless that
method is incompatible with the law of the receiving
State), or by informal delivery to an addressee who
voluntarily accepts service.36 Each Contracting State
may require documents served by its Central Authority
pursuant to local law to be translated into one of its
official languages.37 After attempting – and hopefully
completing – service, the Central Authority of the
receiving State returns to the applicant a certificate
describing the method, time, and place of service and

Service through judicial officers, officials, or other
competent persons: The Convention also permits
service to be made “directly through the judicial
officers, officials, or other competent persons” of
the State in which service is to be made, thus
bypassing the Central Authority mechanism.42
Contracting States may also object to this form of
service.43

34. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705 (stating that
“compliance with the Convention is mandatory in all cases to
which it applies”); Convention Art. 1 (in civil or commercial
matters, Convention applicable “in all cases” where
documents must be transmitted abroad to obtain service).
35. See Convention Art. 2. Information about each
State's Central Authority can be found in the country-specific
declarations appended to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 or on the
Department of State’s website. See supra note 14. The
United States Department of Justice is the Central Authority
for the United States. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.49(b). Each
Contracting State may also require that any requests for
service originating from that country be channeled through
its Central Authority. Parties to U.S. litigation, however,
need not channel requests for service in other Contracting
States through the Department of Justice. Instead, American
attorneys may send requests directly to the Central Authority
in the Contracting State where service is to be made. See
Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-2-1, at 173.

38. See Convention Art. 6 (also requiring Central
Authority to explain why documents were not served, if
applicable).
39. See Convention Art. 8; see also Ristau, supra note
14 § 4-3-5(4), at 217 (listing countries that have objected to
service pursuant to Article 8).
40. See Convention Art. 9.
41. See 22 C.F.R. § 92.85.
42. Convention Art. 10(b), (c) (referring to “the
freedom” of forum judicial officers, officials, or “other
competent persons,” as well as “any person interested in a
judicial proceeding,” to effect service directly through
judicial officers, officials, or other competent persons of the
State of destination).

36. See Convention Art. 5.
37. See Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-2-3(5), at 184-89
(suggesting that a State may require translation only if
documents are to be served via its local law, rather than in a
manner requested by the serving party).

43. See id.; see also Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-3-5(4),
at 217 (listing countries that have objected).
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The Hague Convention permits service by
mail, provided the country in which service
is to be made has not objected.

Side agreements between Contracting States:
Contracting States may also enter into separate
agreements establishing additional service
mechanisms.44 The United States does not appear
to be a party to any such agreements.45

At first glance, Article 10(a) of the Convention would
seem to permit a litigant in one Contracting State to
serve documents by mail on a party in another State.
On closer scrutiny, however, the language of Article
10(a) is less clear:

Perhaps the most significant alternative service
mechanism contemplated by the Convention, however,
is service via “postal channels.” This provision,
contained in Article 10(a), has generated a substantial
body of conflicting case law. Because of this, and
because service by mail is perhaps the most frequently
attempted form of international service, the following
sections of this bulletin discuss service by mail in
detail.

Provided the State of destination does not
object, the present Convention shall not
interfere with —
(a) the freedom to send judicial
documents, by postal channels,
directly to persons abroad.
Unlike other provisions of the Convention, which
expressly refer to methods of “serving” judicial
documents,48 Article 10(a) refers merely to “the
freedom to send judicial documents” by postal
channels.49 Noting this distinction, many courts have
interpreted Article 10(a) narrowly to allow litigants
only to send case-related documents through the mail
after service has been formally accomplished by other
means.50 These courts reason that, because the

Service by mail under the Convention and
the effect of Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2
Article 10(a) “has engendered more litigation in the
United States than any other section of the
Convention.”46 Courts in the United States, for
example, are sharply divided on whether Article 10(a)
permits international mail service at all, a question the
North Carolina Court of Appeals appears to have
answered in the affirmative.47 Moreover, there remain
unanswered questions about the mechanics of
international mail service, among them whether
litigants or the clerk of court are responsible for mail
service and whether the Convention, Rule 4(j3), or
constitutional principles require translation of service
papers. The following sections attempt to provide
guidance in answering these questions.

48. See, e.g., Convention Art. 5 (requiring Central
Authority to “serve the document or . . . arrange to have it
served”); Art. 8 (Contracting States “shall be free to effect
service” in some cases through diplomatic or consular
agents); Art. 9 (Contracting States “shall be free” to use
consular agents to forward documents “for the purpose of
service” to authorities in country where service is to be
made); Art. 10(b) & (c) (Convention “shall not interfere with
. . . the freedom” of judicial officers and others “to effect
service” through competent person of State where service is
to be made); Art. 19 (raising prospect of alternative methods
“for service” of documents permitted by internal law of
country where service is to be made).

44. See Convention Art. 11. Article 11 appears
primarily to contemplate “side agreements” permitting
“direct communication between [the] respective authorities”
of the Contracting States. Id. (referencing such agreements
“in particular”).

49. Convention Art. 10(a) (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA
M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2002); Sardanis v.
Sumitomo Corp., 279 A.D.2d 225, 229 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001); Knapp v. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 60 F. Supp. 2d
566, 573 (S.D. W.Va. 1999); Golub v. Isuzu Motors, 924 F.
Supp. 324, 327-28 (D. Mass. 1996); Brand v. Mazda Motor
of America, 920 F. Supp. 1169, 1172 (D. Kan. 1996);
Pennebaker v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 155 F.R.D. 153, 157
(S.D. Miss. 1994); Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889
F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1989); Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior
Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381-82 (1988); Prost v. Honda
Motor Co., 122 F.R.D 215, 216-17 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Cooper

45. See Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-3-5(3), at 216.
Article 19 of the Convention is a “savings provision,” which
makes clear that the Convention does not abrogate more
liberal service rules under which a Contracting State “permits
methods of transmission . . . of documents coming from
abroad, for service in its territory.” Convention Art. 19; see
also Born, supra note 11 at 812 & 822 n.8.
46. Born, supra note 11 at 811.
47. See infra notes 55 through 58 and accompanying
text.
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Convention uses the term “service” repeatedly in other
Articles, the omission of that term from Article 10(a)
must have been deliberate.51 By contrast, other courts
disagree with this narrow interpretation and read
Article 10(a) to permit service of process by mail.52
These courts note that the express purpose of the
Convention is to “create appropriate means to ensure
that . . . documents to be served abroad shall be
brought to the notice of the addressee,”53 and typically
attribute the absence of the term “service” from Article
10(a) to “careless drafting.”54

in subsequent cases the Court of Appeals has again
stated that mail service is consistent with the
Convention and Article 10(a).57 The Court of Appeals
has thus aligned itself with those courts that have
concluded that the Convention permits service by
mail.58

Numerous Contracting States object to
service by mail.
Although Article 10(a) may permit service by “postal
channels,” each Contracting State retains the right to
object to this manner of service.59 A number of States
have exercised this right, including those on the
following list:

The North Carolina cases are consistent with the
broader interpretation of Article 10(a). In Hayes v.
Evergo Telephone Co., for example, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that service upon a
defendant in Hong Kong by international registered
mail, return receipt requested, was consistent with the
Hague Convention.55 Although the Court did not hold
that Article 10(a) permits service by mail in all cases,56

• Argentina
• China
• Egypt
• Greece
• Latvia

v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16, 17 (D. Me. 1987);
Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464, 466 (S.D.
Miss. 1986); Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444, 446
(S.D. Iowa 1985).

• Bulgaria
• Czech Republic
• Germany
• Hungary
• Lithuania

service, although it did not explain whether Hong Kong’s
internal law permitted service by mail “of documents coming
from abroad,” as Article 19 requires. See supra note 45.
57. See, e.g., Warzynski, 102 N.C. App. at 228, 401
S.E.2d at 805 (not mentioning Article 10(a) but affirming
mail service on Spanish company under Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2);
Peele, 136 N.C. App. at 208-09, 523 S.E.2d at 127 (stating
that Article 10(a) permits mail service). Note, however, that
Article 10(a) may not have been at issue in Peele. In that
case, a German court apparently sent service papers in a
German lawsuit to the U.S. Marshals Service, which served
the defendant by mail in North Carolina. Thus, service
seems to have been made via the Central Authority
mechanism – the Marshals Service formerly served
documents on behalf of the U.S. Central Authority – and not
via Article 10(a), which contemplates mail service “sent
directly to persons abroad.” Convention Art. 10(a).

51. See, e.g., Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444,
446 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
52. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 802
(9th Cir. 2004); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839-40
(2d Cir. 1986); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp.
2d 460, 470-74 (D.N.J. 1998); R. Griggs Group Ltd. v.
Filanto Spa, 920 F. Supp. 1100, 1104-08 (D. Nev. 1996);
Gapanovich v. Komori Corp., 605 A.2d 1120, 1123-24 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Patty v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
777 F. Supp. 956, 959 (N.D. Ga. 1991); Meyers v. ASICS
Corp., 711 F. Supp. 1001, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1989);
Hammond v. Honda Motor Co., 128 F.R.D. 638, 641 (D.S.C.
1989); Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 566 A.2d 135, 143
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import,
Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Weight v.
Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 1082, 1085-86
(E.D. Va. 1984).

58. See supra note 52. This broader interpretation of
Article 10(a) draws additional support from the negotiating
history of the Convention and, apparently, is shared by the
U.S. State Department. See Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-3-5(2),
at 205 (reviewing drafting history and concluding that “the
draftsmen of the Convention intended the language ‘to send
judicial documents, by postal channels’ to include the service
of process”); Letter from Alan J. Kreczko, U.S. Dep’t of
State Deputy Legal Advisor, to the Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts (Mar. 14, 1991), quoted in U.S. Dep’t of State Op.
Regarding the Bankston Case, 30 I.L.M. 260 (1991)
(disagreeing with federal case holding that the Hague
Convention does not permit service by registered mail).

53. Convention, preamble (emphasis added).
54. Sandoval v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 527 A.2d 564,
566 (Pa. Super. 1987).
55. 100 N.C. App. 474, 479, 397 S.E.2d 325, 328
(1980).
56. See id. The Court held that service was proper “in
this case,” relying in part on Article 19 of the Convention,
which allows service by methods permitted by the internal
law of the State where service is to be made. The Court
indicated that Hong Kong’s “internal law” permitted mail

59. See Convention Art. 10 & 21.
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• Luxembourg
• Norway
• Poland
• Rep. of San Marino
• Rep. of South Korea • Slovak Republic
• Sri Lanka
• Switzerland
• Turkey
• Ukraine
• Venezuela60

mail upon parties located in the Contracting States
listed above. Service by mail is permitted, however, in
the remaining States listed in Table A.64
The fact that Article 10(a) permits service by mail
in a particular State, however, does not end the inquiry,
because Article 10(a) says nothing about what
procedures, if any, govern mail service. The following
sections therefore address two unanswered procedural
questions. First, must parties attempting mail service
in a Contracting State comply with North Carolina
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j3)(2)c.2, the only provision
that expressly authorizes service by mail in foreign
countries? Second, must service papers be translated
into an official language of the country in which
service is to be made, or translated into a language
spoken by the defendant?

Courts have generally held that service by mail is
improper in the countries that have objected to Article
10(a).61 The few relevant North Carolina cases are
consistent with this rule. In Hayes, for example, the
Court of Appeals upheld service by mail upon a
defendant in Hong Kong, finding “particularly
compelling the fact that . . . Hong Kong has not
objected to any portion of Article 10.”62 Likewise, in
Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, the Court of Appeals held
that Article 10(a) did not authorize service on a
defendant in Turkey, which has objected to service by
mail.63 Therefore, litigants may not effect service by

Procedural requirements governing service
by mail
Rule 4(j3)(2) authorizes a number of alternative
methods of service in cases where there is no
“internationally agreed means of service” or “the
applicable international agreement allows other means
of service.”65 Of particular relevance here is
4(j3)(2)c.2, the only provision in the Rules of Civil
Procedure expressly to authorize international mail
service.66 The rule imposes two significant

60. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, accompanying materials
(listing declarations of Contracting States); U.S. Dep’t of
State flyer, Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil and
Commercial Matters <http://travel.state.gov/law/ hague_
service.html> (listing States that have objected to service via
postal channels); Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law,
Declarations of the Republic of Hungary <http://hcch. evision.nl/index_en.php?act =status.comment& csid=912&
disp=resdn>; Declarations of the Republic of San Marino
<http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act= status.comment&
csid=437&disp=resdn>; Declarations of the Republic of
Bulgaria <http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=status.
comment&csid=28&disp=resdn> (last visited Nov. 30,
2004).

custody cases where defendant has actual notice of the
action).
64. The fact that a State has not objected to a method
of service, however, does not necessarily mean that the
State’s courts will enforce the resulting U.S. judgment.
Japan, for example, does not object to service by mail but has
stated that its failure to object “does not necessarily imply
that [mail service] . . . is considered valid service in Japan; it
merely indicates that Japan does not consider it as an
infringement of its sovereign power.” See Hague Conf. on
Private Int’l Law: Special Comm’n Report on the Operation
of the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence
Convention, 28 Int’l Legal Mat. 1556, 1561 (1989); see also
U.S. Dep’t of State flyer, Service of Process in Japan
<http://travel.state.gov/law/japan_service.html> (noting
potential enforcement problems) (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).

61. See, e.g., Shenouda v. Mehanna, 203 F.R.D. 166,
171 (D.N.J. 2001); Davies v. Jobs & Adverts Online, Gmbh,
94 F. Supp. 2d 719, 721 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2000); Lyman Steel
Corp. v. Ferrostaal Metals Corp., 747 F. Supp. 389, 399-400
(N.D. Ohio 1990); Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porsche A.G. v. Superior
Court, 123 Cal.App.3d 755, 761-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see
also DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280,
288 (3d Cir.1981) (Convention authorizes methods of service
in addition to Central Authority mechanism “as long as the
nation receiving service has not objected to the method
used”).

65. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(2).

62. 100 N.C. App. at 479, 397 S.E.2d at 328; see also
Peele, 136 N.C. App. at 208-09, 523 S.E.2d at 127 (noting
that the Convention authorizes service by mail and that the
United States had not objected to such service).

66. Although Rule 4(j)(1)c authorizes service “within
or without” North Carolina by registered or certified mail,
return receipt requested, this general service provision
presumably does not authorize international mail service in a
manner inconsistent with the more specific provisions
contained in Rule 4(j3). Cf. Fowler v. Valencourt, 334 N.C.
345, 349, 435 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1993) (“Where one of two

63. See 124 N.C. App. at 263, 477 S.E.2d at 243
(approving service notwithstanding this defect after holding
that formal defects in service are not necessarily fatal in child
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requirements: service must be by “any form of mail
requiring a signed receipt,” and the documents must be
“addressed and dispatched by the clerk of court to the
party to be served.”67 These procedures generally
must be followed if there is no “internationally agreed
means” of mail service available under Rule 4(j3)(1),
as when the party to be served is located in a country
that has not ratified or acceded to the Hague
Convention. The question remains, however, whether
service by mail must always satisfy Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2,
even when the party to be served is located in a
Contracting State.

merely permits litigants to use postal channels if forum
law specifically authorizes them to do so, a North
Carolina plaintiff arguably would have to comply with
Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.71
Although there is little law in North Carolina or
elsewhere on this issue, there is some reason to believe
that international mail service must comply with Rule
4(j3)(2)c.2. First, if the Convention is meant to
authorize mail service even where forum law provides
no such authority, then the text of Article 10(a) is
poorly suited to achieving that goal. Article 10(a)
simply provides that the Convention “shall not
interfere with . . . the freedom” to send documents by
mail.72 This of course begs the question: what
freedom? Presumably, if a litigant is “free” to effect
service in a particular way, it is because other (nonConvention) law authorizes service to be made in that
manner.73

The answer to this question depends on whether
Rule 4(j3)(1) authorizes the use of all methods of
service identified by the Convention. Recall that Rule
4(j3)(1) directs litigants to effect service “[b]y any
internationally agreed means . . . such as those means
authorized by the Hague Convention.” Because the
Convention clearly authorizes use of its Central
Authority mechanism, this method of service is
available to litigants under Rule 4(j3)(1).68 But
matters are not so clear with respect to Article 10(a).

The negotiating history of the Convention appears
to be consistent with the view that forum law must
authorize international mail service. According to a
report on the text of the draft convention:

Is service via postal channels an “internationally
agreed means” of service, or one “authorized” by the
Convention? If it is, then this method of service is
available under Rule 4(j3)(1). And, because neither
Rule 4(j3)(1) nor Article 10(a) require any particular
type of mail service,69 litigants could presumably use
any form of mail reasonably calculated to notify the
defendant of the action.70 By contrast, if Article 10(a)

It should be stressed that in permitting the
utilization of postal channels, provided the
state of destination does not object, the draft
convention did not intend to pass on the
validity of this mode of transmission under
the law of the forum state: in order for the
postal channel to be utilized, it is necessary

statutes might apply to the same situation, the statute which
deals more directly and specifically with the situation
controls over the statute of more general applicability.”).
Likewise, although 4(j3)(2)a authorizes service “in a manner
prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in
that country in an action in any of its courts of general
jurisdiction,” it is unlikely that this provision was intended to
authorize international service by mail. See, e.g.,
Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 806-08 (9th Cir. 2004) (so
holding with respect to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(A)).

requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise defendant of
the action and an opportunity to present objections).
71. Because under this reading the Convention would
allow, but not authorize, service by “postal channels,” the
mail service provisions of Rule 4(j3)(2) would be available.
See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(2) (listing service methods
available if there is no “internationally agreed means” of
service or if the “applicable international agreement” allows
other methods).

67. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.
68. See Born, supra note 11 at 808 n.5(b).
69. See Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-3-5(2), at 205
(quoting report on draft Convention: “The Commission did
not accept the proposal that postal channels be limited to
registered mail”).

72. Compare this language to the detailed provisions
governing service via the Central Authority mechanism. See
Convention Art. 3-7.
73. Cf. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700 (looking to forum law
to determine whether service required transmittal of
document abroad, thus implicating the Convention).

70. See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(1) (authorizing service
by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to
give notice); see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (due process
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that it be authorized by the law of the forum
state.74

litigants to comply with federal Rule 4. In Brockmeyer
v. May,78 for example, a federal district court declined
to set aside a default judgment that had been entered
against a company registered under the law of the
United Kingdom. The defendant had been served by
ordinary first class mail addressed and dispatched by
the plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, explaining that, although the Hague
Convention permitted mail service, “Article 10(a) does
not itself affirmatively authorize international mail
service.”79 The Court reasoned:

Although this report commented on a prior draft of
Article 10, except for “minor editorial changes” the
final text corresponds to that of the draft.75
The U.S. Department of State likewise appears to
assume that international mail service must comply
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), the federal
counterpart to North Carolina’s Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2. A
Department of State circular discussing service of legal
documents abroad states:

[W]e must look outside the Hague
Convention for affirmative authorization of
the international mail service that is merely
not forbidden by Article 10(a). Any
affirmative authorization of service by
international mail, and any requirements as to
how that service is to be accomplished, must
come from the law of the forum in which the
suit is filed.80

SERVICE BY INTERNATIONAL
REGISTERED MAIL: (Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii),
F.R. Cv. P.) registered or certified mail, return
receipt requested may be sent to most
countries in the world. Rule 4(f)(2)(C)
provides that this method of service may be
used unless prohibited by the law of the
foreign country.76

Based on this reasoning, the court held that the
plaintiff’s chosen method of service – sending the
summons and complaint by ordinary first class mail to
a post office address for the defendant – was not
authorized by any provision of federal Rule 4. This
holding echoes that of Borschow Hospital & Medical
Supplies, Inc. v. Burdick-Siemens Corp., in which a
federal district court concluded that service must
conform to the international mail provisions of federal
Rule 4.81

Notwithstanding the text of Article 10(a) and the
negotiating and interpretive history discussed above,
federal courts have disagreed about the need to comply
with the procedures set out in federal Rule 4. Some
courts have held that the Convention provides
independent authority for international mail service
regardless whether the serving party complies with
Rule 4.77 Other courts, however, have required
74. Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-3-5(2), at 205 (quoting
Service Convention Negotiating Document at 90) (translated
from French by Ristau).

The few North Carolina cases to address the
validity of international mail service do not make clear
whether service must comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.
At times, courts seem to have assumed that parties

75. See id. (citing Service Convention Negotiating
Document at 373).
76. U.S. Department of State flyer, Service of Legal
Documents Abroad ¶ E <http://travel.state. gov/law/
service_general.html> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004). The
Department of State flyer lists no source of authority for
international mail service other than Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(f)(2)(C)(ii), the text of which is identical to that of North
Carolina’s Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.

25-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying Ackerman to service by
U.S. plaintiff on foreign defendant: “Even though the use of
international registered mail may be invalid under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4 to effectuate service upon a foreign party, the rule
of this Circuit is clear and broad: the Hague Convention
“‘supplements’” the Federal Rules thereby providing an
independent manner of service”).

77. These courts typically have reached this conclusion
by reasoning that the Convention “supplements” federal Rule
4, rather than by interpreting Rule 4(f)(1) – the twin of N.C.
Rule 4(j3)(1) – to authorize international mail service. See,
e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1986)
(evaluating service by German plaintiff on U.S. defendant
and stating that the Convention “‘supplements’ – and is
manifestly not limited by – [federal] Rule 4”); Modefine, S.A.
v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 164 F.R.D. 24,

78. 383 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2004).
79. Id. at 803.
80. Id. at 804.
81. 143 F.R.D. 472, 486 (D. Puerto Rico 1992) (mail
service on a foreign defendant is proper but must conform to
the international mail service provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4,
then contained in Rule 4(i)).
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must comply with the rule. In Warzynski v. Empire
Comfort Systems, for example, the Court of Appeals
upheld service by mail on a Spanish defendant. In a
brief analysis, the Court noted that the plaintiff had
complied with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.82 Likewise, in Hocke
v. Hanyane, the Court of Appeals affirmed a default
judgment entered against a South African defendant
after evaluating whether service complied with Rule
4(j3)(2)c.2.83 These holdings are consistent with the
text of Rule 4(j3) itself, which requires that “[p]roof of
service by mail shall include an affidavit or certificate
of addressing and mailing by the clerk of court.”84

suggest that service by mail is not an “internationally
agreed means” of service available to litigants under
Rule 4(j3)(1).87 Moreover, by requiring an affidavit or
certificate from the clerk as proof of service by mail,
Rule 4(j3) arguably envisions compliance with
4(j3)(2)c.2 in all cases. Until the appellate courts
provide definitive guidance on this issue, a litigant who
wishes to use the mails to serve a party located in a
Contracting State to the Hague Convention would be
prudent to comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.88

Translation requirements for service papers
A plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 is
only one of the grounds on which a defendant may
challenge international mail service. Another common
challenge is to the plaintiff’s failure to translate the
service papers.89 This challenge typically takes one of
two forms. In some cases, a defendant may argue that
the Hague Convention requires translation into the
official language of the country in which service is
made. As will be explained, courts are nearly uniform
in rejecting this argument. A more serious objection is
that due process requires that the summons and

In Hayes v. Evergo Telephone Company, Ltd.,
however, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of
mail service upon a defendant in Hong Kong, even
though the plaintiff, rather than the clerk, apparently
mailed the service papers.85 Although the Court
discussed whether Article 10(a) permitted service by
mail and ultimately concluded that service “was in
conformity with the provisions of the Hague
Convention,” it did not discuss the fact that service
was not in conformity with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2. 86
Under North Carolina law, therefore, it is not
certain whether international mail service must comply
with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2. A variety of factors, however,
suggest that litigants must comply with the rule. As
discussed above, these factors include the text and
negotiating history of the Convention, which arguably

87. Though the text of the Convention and Rule 4(j3)
may permit this reading, note the potential for unusual
(arguably undesirable) results if a similar analysis is applied
to the Convention’s other “alternative” service methods.
Consider, for example, an interpretation under which the
Central Authority mechanism is the only “internationally
agreed means” of service available under Rule 4(j3)(1). See
supra note 48 (quoting Art. 8-10, each of which, like Article
10(a), refers to the “free[dom]” to use particular service
methods). Under this interpretation, litigants could use the
Convention’s numerous “alternative” service methods only if
they were listed in Rule 4(j3)(2) or ordered by the court
under Rule 4(j3)(3). See Born, supra n. 11 at 808 n.5(c).
But Rule 4(j3)(2) does not list some of the Convention’s
“alternative” service methods, such as service through
diplomatic or consular channels. See id. & n.5(d) (also
noting that Convention might “supplement” Rule 4).

82. 102 N.C. App. at 228, 401 S.E.2d at 805 (“Rule
4(j3) establishes procedures for service of process in a
foreign country. The rule allows for service by any form of
mail requiring a signed receipt and addressed and dispatched
by the clerk of court to the party to be served.”).
83. 118 N.C. App. at 632-634, 456 S.E.2d at 859-60.
84. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3) (emphasis added).
85. See 100 N.C. App. at 476, 397 S.E.2d at 327
(noting that “Plaintiff effected service of process . . . by
sending the summons, together with the complaint via
registered mail, return receipt requested”).

88. Note that Rule 4(j3)(3) permits service upon
defendants in foreign countries “[b]y other means not
prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by
the court.” Under this rule, mail service that did not comply
with 4(j3)(2)c.2 might be proper if made pursuant to a court
order and if the method chosen was not prohibited by an
international agreement. See, e.g., Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at
805-06; Levin v. Rush Trading Co., 248 F. Supp. 537, 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (upholding service by ordinary mail on
defendant and his attorneys pursuant to court order).

86. Id. at 479, 397 S.E.2d at 328. And in Tataragasi v.
Tataragasi, 124 N.C. App. 255, 477 S.E.2d 239 (1996), the
Court of Appeals upheld the validity of service by mail, in a
child custody action, on a defendant in Turkey, even though
Turkey has objected to Article 10(a) and the plaintiff failed
to comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2. Tataragasi is an unusual
case, however, and the Court appeared to limit its holding to
child custody cases in which the plaintiff attempts in good
faith to comply with the Convention and the defendant has
actual notice of the action. See id. at 264, 477 S.E.2d at 244.

89. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dusselberg v. Peele, 136
N.C. App. 206, 211, 523 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1999).
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complaint be translated into a language understood by
the defendant. Each of these potential objections to
service is addressed below.

The North Carolina appellate courts have not
clearly addressed whether Rule 4(j3) requires litigants
to translate service documents. The most pertinent
case appears to be State ex rel. Dusselberg v. Peele,94
in which the Court of Appeals entertained a North
Carolina defendant’s challenge to the alleged failure to
translate a summons and complaint. In Peele, the U.S.
Marshals Service received process issued by a German
court in a child support action and served the defendant
by mail. The German court entered a judgment against
the defendant, which the plaintiff registered in North
Carolina. The defendant moved to vacate registration
of the judgment, in part because the service papers he
received allegedly had not been translated into English.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that the evidence
was sufficient to find that the defendant had, in fact,
received a translation of the summons and complaint
and, therefore, that “the trial court could have found
that defendant was properly served.”95

Litigants who attempt service through the
receiving State’s Central Authority may be required to
translate the summons and complaint into an official
language of the receiving State. Recall that service via
the Central Authority mechanism includes three
potential methods of service: service “by a method
proscribed by [the receiving State’s] internal law” for
service in domestic actions upon persons located
within its territory; service by a method requested by
the serving party; or voluntary acceptance by the party
being served.90 Under Article 5 of the Convention,
Contracting States may require translation of
documents served by the first of these methods.91
In a number of cases, defendants have attempted
to extend this translation requirement to service by
mail. The text of the Convention offers little support
for such a requirement: Article 10 does not expressly
authorize receiving States to impose translation
requirements, and Article 5 is plainly limited to service
via the receiving State’s Central Authority.92 Nor do
the federal or relevant state rules of civil procedure
contain such a requirement. Not surprisingly, then, in
virtually every case courts have limited the
Convention’s translation provisions to service via the
Central Authority mechanism.93

For a number of reasons, however, Peele does not
answer whether Rule 4(j3) or Article 10(a) require
translation of service documents. First, the defendant
in Peele appears to have been served via the Central
Authority mechanism, and the case therefore did not
require interpretation of Article 10(a).96 Second, the
mail service in Peele was accomplished under Rule
4(j)(1)(c), and the Court of Appeals therefore was not
required to interpret Rule 4(j3), which governs service
of U.S. process on defendants in foreign countries.97
Third, the Peele court did not expressly hold that a
translation was required and did not identify the source
of such a requirement.

90. See Convention Art. 5; see also supra notes 35-38
and accompanying text (discussing Central Authority
mechanism).

The likeliest source of any translation requirement
– whether documents are served by mail or any other
means – is the constitutional requirement of due
process, which guarantees a defendant “notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to

91. See id.; see also Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-2-3(5),
at 184-89 (discussing translation requirement); Born, supra
note 11 at 802-03 (same).
92. See Convention Art. 5 (“If the document is to be
served under the first paragraph above [referring to Central
Authority mechanism], the Central Authority may require”
translation).

94. 136 N.C. App. 206, 523 S.E.2d 125 (1999).
95. Id. at 211, 523 S.E.2d at 128.

93. See, e.g., Taft v. Moreau, 177 F.R.D. 201, 204 (D.
Vt. 1997); Parsons v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M., 565 So.
2d 20, 25 (Ala. 1990); Hammond v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd.,
128 F.R.D. 638, 640 (D.S.C. 1989); Lemme v. Wine of Japan
Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Weight
v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 1082, 1086
(E.D. Va. 1984). But see Borschow Hospital & Med.
Supplies, Inc. v. Burdick-Siemens Corp., 143 F.R.D. 472, 480
(D. Puerto Rico 1992) (holding that service by mail must be
translated in order to achieve the notice goals of service,
although not basing this holding on the Convention).

96. Until recently, the U.S. Marshals Service handled
service for the U.S. Central Authority, the Department of
State. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 n.8
(2d Cir. 1986). Thus, service in Peele appears to have been
made by the first method authorized by Article 5: service by
the Central Authority in a manner prescribed by the internal
law of the receiving State. See Convention Art. 5; see also
supra note 57 (discussing Peele).
97. See Peele, 136 N.C. App. at 208, 523 S.E.2d at
127.
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apprise [him or her] of the pendency of the action and
afford . . . an opportunity to present [his or her]
objections.”98 As a number of courts have noted, due
process may require service of documents translated
into a language understood by the defendant.99 Like
these courts, the Court of Appeals in Peele seems to
have been concerned primarily with whether the
defendant received notice sufficient to enable him to
understand the action and to present any objections.
Indeed, the Court emphasized that the defendant had
received and signed for the summons and complaint,
had taken these papers to his lawyer, and had
acknowledged “‘that he knew what [the papers were]
concerning.”100

failure to translate service papers may violate a
defendant’s right to due process.

Service of process on members of the
U.S. armed forces
Lawsuits requiring international service of process
frequently involve members of the U.S. Armed Forces
stationed abroad. Members of the Armed Forces are
subject to the same rules governing service of process
as other persons living abroad.103 Military policies,
however, can affect the method and availability of
service in particular cases. This section briefly
discusses how these policies impact service on
members of the Armed Forces. Readers interested in a
more thorough treatment of service of process on
members of the Armed Forces should read
Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/08,
Service of Process and the Military (Dec. 2004).

In this respect, Peele is consistent with numerous
cases from other jurisdictions and indicates that, in
North Carolina, failure to translate documents into a
language understood by the defendant may raise due
process concerns. Whether due process requires
translation in a particular case will necessarily be a
fact-specific inquiry.101 A thorough discussion of this
due process issue is beyond the scope of this bulletin,
but as a general rule courts have upheld service of
untranslated documents where the defendant
understands the documents or takes the papers to an
attorney who understands them.102 In other cases,

Military authorities are not responsible for serving
process on members of the Armed Forces or civilians
working or residing on military installations.104
Military authorities, however, will generally determine
whether a servicemember will accept service and will
convey documents to the servicemember if he or she
agrees to accept them. Absent voluntary acceptance,
however, military authorities generally play no further
role in service and, instead, inform the serving party to

98. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; McDonald’s Corp. v.
Dwyer, 338 N.C. 445, 448, 450 S.E.2d 888, 891 (1994).

speaking attorney); Lafarge Corp., 2000 WL 687708 at *12
(serving untranslated documents did not violate due process
where defendant did not claim inability to understand
documents); Heredia, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 162 (no due process
violation where evidence demonstrated some competence in
English and defendant signed return receipt that
accompanied service of process); Taft, 177 F.R.D. at 204
(service of untranslated document did not violate due process
where defendants did not claim lack of notice or inability to
understand document); Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 464 (no due
process violation where summons, but not complaint, was
translated into defendant’s language).

99. See, e.g., Mario Valente Collezioni, Ltd. v.
Confezioni Semeraro Paolo, S.R.L., 115 F. Supp. 2d 367
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Lafarge Corp. v. M/V MACEDONIA
HELLAS, 2000 WL 687708 at *12 (E.D. La. 2000); Heredia
v. Transport S.A.S., Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Taft v. Moreau, 177 F.R.D. 201, 204 (D. Vt. 1997);
Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456
(E.D.N.Y. 1986); Parsons v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M.,
565 So. 2d 20, 25 (Ala. 1990).
100. 136 N.C. App. at 211, 523 S.E.2d at 128.
101. See, e.g., Bliek v. Palmer, 102 F.3d 1472, 1475
(8th Cir. 1997) (“Due process is a flexible concept and a
determination of what process is due, or what notice is
adequate, depends upon the particular circumstances
involved.”); James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82
F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (precise requirements of
due process depend on circumstances; in every case,
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard is required).

103. Rule 4(j3) applies to “service upon a defendant . . .
effected in a place not within the United States” and does not
distinguish members of the Armed Forces from other civil
litigants.
104. The military has generally avoided directly serving
process on servicemembers, in part due to a concern that
providing such assistance to civil litigants would violate the
Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, which criminalizes
“willfully us[ing] any part of the Army or the Air Force as a
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws.” See
Cook, supra note 8 at 173.

102. See, e.g., Confezioni Semeraro Paolo, S.R.L., 115
F. Supp. 2d at 372 (serving untranslated summons and
complaint on Italian defendant did not violate due process
where defendant immediately took papers to English
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comply with service procedures established by the law
of the pertinent foreign country.105

personnel to obtain the addressee’s signature prior to
delivering mail for which a return receipt has been
requested and to “return the receipt(s) promptly to the
source.”109 If a servicemember refuses to accept
certified or registered mail, MPO personnel should
endorse the document “refused” and return it to the
sender.110 Proof that the summons and complaint were
delivered to the servicemember should therefore be
available in most cases.

A servicemember stationed abroad in a
Contracting State may be served by the Central
Authority of that State. In certain cases, however, the
Central Authority mechanism may be unavailable or
inefficient. For example, the foreign Central
Authority may not have the right to enter the military
installation to serve process. Whether the Central
Authority has this right is governed by the applicable
Status of Forces agreement between the United States
and the country in which the military installation is
located. If not allowed to enter the installation, the
Central Authority may attempt service outside the
installation, but there is no guarantee that it will
successfully complete service. Some foreign Central
Authorities, moreover, may decline to attempt service
at all under the applicable Status of Forces
agreement.106

Conclusion
International service of process, though “complex and
time consuming,”111 has become considerably more
regularized in recent years. If the Hague Convention
applies, the receiving State’s Central Authority may be
able to serve the summons and complaint. Moreover,
service by mail is often available, both in countries
where the Hague Convention applies and in countries
not party to such international agreements. Rule
4(j3)(2)c.2 establishes the procedures governing mail
service. While there remains some question whether
these procedures must be followed to complete mail
service in Contracting States to the Hague Convention,
there is a substantial argument that litigants must
comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 in all cases. Because
members of the U.S. Armed Forces must be served in
the same manner as civilian litigants, these procedures
apply to mail service on members of the military as
well.

Because the Central Authority mechanism may be
unreliable or inefficient, many litigants attempt to
serve members of the Armed Forces via international
mail. Once again, the same rules governing mail
service apply to servicemembers as to civilians who
are not affiliated with the military. Therefore, as
discussed above, litigants would be prudent to comply
with the requirements of Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 in all cases,
even if the servicemember is stationed in a Contracting
State. And, as discussed above, service by mail is not
allowed in those countries that have objected to service
by “postal channels.”107
The Department of Defense operates Military Post
Offices (MPOs) for military personnel overseas or on
ships where the U.S. Postal Service does not
operate.108 Military policy appears to require MPO
105. See 32 C.F.R. 516.12(c) (Army regulation
establishing policies for service of state court process outside
the U.S.); 32 C.F.R. 516.13 (listing contact information for
those seeking assistance or information concerning service of
process overseas); 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(2) (Navy policies
governing service of out-of-state process).
106. See U.S. Dep’t of State Flyer, Service of Legal
Documents Abroad ¶ N (Sept. 2000) <http://travel.state.gov/
law/service_general.html> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).

Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps. have Fleet Post
Office (FPO) addresses. See id.

107. See supra page 9.
108. See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Dir. 4525.6-M,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSTAL MANUAL at 17 (Aug. 15,
2002). Servicemembers in the Army or Air Force have
Army Post Office (APO) addresses, and members of the

109. Id. ¶ C3.2.7.1.10, at 73.
110. See id. ¶ C3.2.5.8.1, at 71.
111. See supra note 10.

15

Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/07

December 2004

Table A
States that have ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention112
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Anguilla
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Aruba
Bahamas
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize†
Bermuda
Botswana
British Virgin Islands
Bulgaria
Canada
Cayman Islands
China
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti (formerly Afars
and Issas)†
Egypt
Estonia
Falklands Islands
Fiji†
Finland
France (incl. French
Overseas Depts.)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

French Polynesia†
Germany
Gibraltar†
Greece
Guernsey
Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region
Hungary‡
Ireland
Isle of Man
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jersey
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
Kuwait
Kiribati (formerly Gilbert Islands and
Central and Southern Line Islands) †
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macau Special Administrative Region
Malawi
Mexico
Montserrat
Netherlands
Nevis†
Norway

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Pakistan
Pitcairn
Poland
Portugal
Romania‡
Russian Federation
St. Christopher (Kitts)
St. Helena and Dependencies
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines†
San Marino
Seychelles
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands†
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Turks and Caicos Islands
Tuvalu (formerly Ellice Islands) †
Ukraine
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
• United States (incl. Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands)
• Venezuela
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112. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, accompanying materials (listing parties to Convention and declarations of Contracting States).
†
See U.S. Dep’t of State flyer, Hague Convention on the Serv. Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil
and Comm. Matters <http://travel.state.gov/law/hague_service.html> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004). The list assumes the
Convention remains in force in countries that have achieved independence after it was extended to them, including Belize,
Djibouti, Fiji, Kiribati, Nevis, St. Christopher, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. See id.
‡
See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table: Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters <http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=
conventions.status&cid=17#nonmem> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004) (noting recent accession of Hungary and Romania;
Convention enters into force in Hungary April 1, 2005).
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